Madam President, I rise to support the amendment, as

well, and to thank Senator Graham for the characteristic thoughtfulness

he brought to this matter and the very constructive additions this

amendment makes to the bill and to clarify the authority and the

importance of these centers.

This is one of the central contributions of this legislation and

derivatively of the 9/11 Commission Report. It grows out of the

outrageous failure to share information prior to September 11 that the

9/11 Commission Report documents in riveting detail.

As the Chair knows, we would establish on the passage of this, a

national counter terrorism center to focus all of our efforts from all

agencies--unity of effort, joint command operations, et cetera--in the

fight against terrorism. We also take this basic idea and say to the

national intelligence director, you can set up other centers to deal

with other particular problems--maybe a specific threat like weapons of

mass destruction or nuclear proliferation specifically or a country or

subgroup that may be threatening--the United States, set up a center on

North Korea or Iran--and you would guarantee, thereby, in these other

centers that all the arms of our Government would know what the others

would be doing, would be sharing intelligence and analysis of

intelligence through these centers, being able to plan joint operations

for the collection of intelligence, very critically important to inform

the President and the officers of our Government how to deal with these

crisis. Senator Graham's amendment makes clear how important these

centers are that the NID can create.

I stress, also, the centers are not permanent. They are part of the

vision that comes out of the 9/11 Commission Report. The Collins-

Lieberman bill before the Senate now is about modern management, 21st

century management. If there is a problem, create a center with all

your best people around the table planning how to collect and analyze

intelligence about the problem, advise the President, Secretary of

State, Secretary of Defense, whomever. Once that problem is resolved,

that center can and should be terminated. That is the kind of

flexibility involved.

Senator Graham, as Senator Collins has said, is building on an

extraordinary record of experience and very constructive leadership,

outspoken, appropriately outspoken leadership in the area of

intelligence, and has given us the benefit of that experience with this

amendment. I thank him for it. I am happy to accept the amendment on

our side.

Mr. President, I am proud to be a cosponsor of this

amendment with Senator McCain. This, again, is part of our attempt to

implement through legislation as many of the recommendations of the 9/

11 Commission Report as we possibly can.

This is a critical one. The Commission made a finding not usually

focused on, as part of its work, that there is a danger because of the

slowness of the transition from one administration to the next that

America will be vulnerable. We have an enemy out there, a terrorist

enemy, that follows this kind of information. I don't make a causal

statement now, but the fact is that it was in 1993, the first year of

the Clinton administration, when the World Trade Center was first

attacked by terrorists with a truck bomb. And it was 2001, of course,

when the Twin Towers and the Pentagon and other targets were attacked,

in the first year of the Bush administration.

These are very good recommendations. I do want to point out simply

that the underlying bill incorporates a related recommendation by the

Commission to consolidate security clearance investigations in one

agency and encourage reciprocity among agencies with respect to those

clearances, which should help streamline what is now a frustratingly

Balkanized system for determining who can have access to sensitive

information.

This is very constructive. I do not believe it is controversial at

all.

To reiterate, this amendment will help ensure that our vital national

security capabilities do not suffer undue disruption during a

presidential transition.

The 9/11 Commission recommended several measures to provide a swift

hand-off between incoming and outgoing national security teams during a

change in presidential administrations, and this amendment reflects

those recommendations.

First, it directs the outgoing administration to provide the

President-elect with a detailed, classified summary of critical

operational threats, including major military or covert operations and

pending decisions on the use of military force. The most important

member of the national security apparatus is the Commander in Chief.

This provision will help the President-elect begin focusing on these

issues, and considering any imminent high stakes decisions that might

need to be made, well in advance of the day he or she takes office.

The amendment also includes several measures to help assure that the

President-elect will have a qualified team of national security

advisors in place early in the new administration and who are able to

hit the ground running.

It calls on the President-Elect to submit the names of likely high

level national security personnel for security clearances as soon as

possible after the election, and directs the appropriate Federal agency

or agencies to complete the necessary investigations for those

clearances as quickly as possible, preferably before the inauguration.

The amendment also urges the administration to submit nominees for

the top national security positions by Inauguration Day and, if it does

so, urges the Senate to act on those nominations within 30 days

wherever possible. I think this language is a useful reminder to both

the executive branch and the Senate that we should act to fill these

positions with all deliberate speed--mindful that delay has costs, but

dedicated as well to careful selection and review of nominees for these

sensitive positions.

Finally, the amendment would allow major party candidates to seek

security clearances for prospective transaction team members prior to

the election, with the goal of having those clearances available the

day after the election.

I should note that the underlying bill already incorporates a related

recommendation by the Commission to consolidate security clearance

investigations in one agency and encourage reciprocity among agencies

with respect to clearances. This should help streamline what is now a

frustratingly balkanized system for determining who can have access to

sensitive information.

We do not include the Commission's recommendation to eliminate Senate

confirmation for national security nominees below the Executive

Schedule III pay grade. This category would include many Assistant

Secretaries with critical policymaking responsibilities. Given the need

for strong Congressional oversight of the intelligence community and

other national security operations, it does not seem wise to remove

this important layer of Congressional review and accountability.

I believe this amendment helps ensure that we do not loosen our

footing in the war on terriorism at moments of presidential transition.

I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

Mr. President, even I want to thank the Senator from

Illinois, a dear friend, a great colleague. He has made a very

substantial contribution to this bill.

Senator Durbin has a quality of service in the Senate that I have

noted in some of the best colleagues with whom I have had the honor to

serve. He thinks about matters, focuses on a problem, comes up with a

solution, and he doesn't let it go until he gets it done. He saw a real

problem here which others have seen but, frankly, have not focused on

or grabbed ahold of as much, which is the woeful, outrageous,

infuriating inability, up until this time, of our Government to put the

best information technology at the disposal of those who are working to

protect us.

The terrorists have figured this out. We all know about the

opportunities for cyberterrorism. If you look at the number of hits

that are made on even Defense Department sites, you can see the

potential. We are beginning to have a very good capacity to launch our

own offensives here, but this is about something else. This is just

taking information, which is a key to protecting ourselves in the age

of terrorism, and moving it quickly to the places it can do the most

good. Talk about connecting the dots.

Anyway, Senator Durbin is really singlehandedly responsible for this

substantial title of the bill. I thank him very much for his

contribution. It is part of why this bill is going to make a real

difference in protecting the security of the American people.

Mr. President, I am pleased to join the chairman of

our committee in urging acceptance of this amendment. I thank Senator

Voinovich and the occupant of the chair, the distinguished Senator from

Tennessee, for their work on this issue.

This is a topic we have been talking about in the Congress for a long

time. The occupant of the chair, having been vetted, considered, and

confirmed for a Cabinet position in the past, knows the difficulties he

and others have faced in fulfilling all those obligations, well beyond

what most would deem to be reasonable.

What motivates this now is an extra dimension of concern. The

September 11 Commission made it very clear that a catastrophic attack

might well be more likely to occur during the transition from one

administration to the other. Therefore, the Commission recommended that

we should do anything we could reasonably think of that would speed up

the process of filling national security positions in our Government.

Earlier today, I am pleased to say, the Senate adopted an amendment

that Senator McCain and I and others introduced to accomplish some of

those specific recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. This amendment

builds on that, goes beyond it, and makes the bill stronger by helping

an incoming administration fill a wide range of its appointive

positions more promptly, in some cases, doing what is just plain

logical: requiring the OPM, Office of Personnel Management, to send

information to Presidential candidates 15 days after they are

nominated; describing positions that must be filled in the new

administration. This would not only allow time to prepare it, it would

create a sense of optimism and fantasy in the minds of candidates

nominated as to what they would do when they were elected. The

amendment also calls for reports that will help us and the President to

consider ways to further improve and streamline the process of getting

officials appointed and put into place.

It is a very good amendment. It builds on some substantial

contributions Senator Voinovich made to the bill in committee. I am

pleased to urge its adoption.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from North Dakota

for his questions. I want to assure him, first, there will be no rental

charges for the charts that were a joint product of Senator Collins's

and my office.

To very briefly give the background, most immediately from the 9/11

Commission Report, when we said here repeatedly, and Lee Hamilton said

during the course of our hearings during the investigation about how 9/

11 happened, the Commissioners very often would say, Who is in charge?

The answer more often than not was: No one. They concluded it was an

organization without a head. That explained why the CIA would have

information and not share it with the Immigration and Naturalization

Service about people they would want to keep out of the country, or the

FBI would have information and not share it with the CIA.

The result was we are athletes--a homelier analogy--that the American

intelligence community is like a football team with a lot of very good

players but no quarterback. So they are kind of doing their own thing;

some of them sometimes seem to be in another stadium and we are not

getting the benefit of the billions of dollars that we are investing.

The Commission recommended that we put someone in charge as a

national intelligence director.

Right now, the President is at the top on the chart. The President

can't exercise day-to-day control over the intelligence community.

Incidentally, this was the report of the 9/11 Commission. Most

immediately, it was essentially the recommendation of the Joint

Intelligence Committee of the Congress, and in the recent past created

a national intelligence director. The Scowcroft report--though we have

not seen it--everybody knows that it says there has to be a national

intelligence director. In fact, these recommendations go way back to

1947 when the National Security Act was passed post-Second World War

and the CIA was officially created. Here is part of the problem. This

is part of what I want to answer about the question.

Part of the problem that all of these groups found was that the

Director of Central Intelligence--as that position exists today, which

was the same person as the Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency--effectively became only the Director of the Central

Intelligence Agency. That is part of why nobody was really directly

overhead.

As we can see in the first chart, the director of the Central

Intelligence Agency is over the CIA. The major recommendation was we

have to separate those two, have a separate CIA Director, and then the

national intelligence director who will be over all those stovepipes.

How will he or she break them up? Two things. First, and this goes on

from Colin Powell and others, we said the existing DCI was supposed to

oversee the whole intelligence operation. We gave them some power but

did not get them budget power. As my friend from North Dakota said, 80

percent of the budget for intelligence goes through the Department of

Defense.

In an episode that Senator Collins and I were struck by in the 9/11

report, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, in 1998, after a

series of al-Qaida attacks, sends out a directive--then classified, now

public--to the agencies under him and says, war has been declared

against us by these terrorists: They hit the World Trade Center in 1993

with the bomb, they went after the embassies in Africa, et cetera. This

is a declaration of war by us and the American intelligence community

against al-Qaida, a war on terrorism. And no one responded. No one did

anything because he is a general without authority.

It is the old biblical line, at the sound of the trumpet, be

uncertain who will follow into battle and, unfortunately, here, one of

the elements of a certain trumpet in the Washington bureaucracy is

money, budget authority. So no one did anything.

When the Commission asked one of the heads of the boxes on the chart,

Why didn't you respond to George Tenet, he said, We didn't think we had

to; we thought that was a memo.

Separate CIA from the Director so he is not responsible only for that

agency but everyone in the community, with the budget authority to

enforce decisions, with transfer authority for personnel within the

intelligence community and, one of the most important, form the budget.

Do not let other agencies do it. Actually do the budget.

The Senator from North Dakota is one of the Senate's experts on

budgeting, one who worries most about whether we are getting taxpayers

their money's worth. Billions of dollars--it is a classified number, so

I cannot state it--but billions go into intelligence every year.

One of my hopes, because we do not talk about it much, we talk about

connecting the dot, the national intelligence director will, one, be a

tough budget official; two, make sure we get our money's worth; and

third, more budget authority and oversight over the constituents. And,

too, maybe decide this box under me is getting more money in terms of

the current threat to America than it should, but this one is not

getting enough; I have to move this money around.

One more point. A critical element under the national intelligence

director to help him or her connect the dots is the National

Counterterrorist Center. The other centers he can create for separate

problems such as nuclear proliferation or separate geographic public

areas like Iran and North Korea. This is the place where he will bring

together as never before all the constituent parts of the intelligence

community. They will sit down. He can transfer people to those centers.

He can give them assignments. Most of all, he can make sure they will

pool their collection of intelligence, their analysis of intelligence

and, very importantly, since they are around the table--they are

talking with one another, they see the problem, they have an idea from

the best intelligence, signal intelligence, imagery from the satellites

we have, human intelligence from people on the ground--they will do

some joint operational planning as to how to deal with the problem. How

do we get bin Laden? Or if there is a terrorist cell in America, what

is the best way to pool our resources to get them? We put somebody in

charge and we give them real authority.

Incidentally, there will be amendments introduced, or already have

been, that will come to a vote in the next 2 or 3 days aimed at cutting

away at that power. I say, with all respect, probably folks worried

about the Department of Defense losing some authority--Senator Collins

and I are both on the Armed Services Committee. We have a deep

commitment to the warfighters. We are confident this structure will

actually give better intelligence to the warfighters.

That is my answer to your question.

They did. Interesting question. As a matter of fact,

this was a real priority for the 9/11 Commission, that we separate the

CIA from the national intelligence director. The point is that the CIA

is only one element of the remarkable assets we have in our

intelligence community, including the so-called signal intelligence,

the imagery from the satellites we have, the work coordinating domestic

and foreign. Because the terrorists do not separate between domestic

and foreign, now for the FBI it is made statutory under the bill

creating a new directorate of intelligence, counterterrorism, working

with the CIA under the national intelligence director. So the answer is

yes.

In fact, my understanding of the original proposal for the National

Security Act post-World War II was there be a separate national

intelligence director overlooking a whole community and a separate CIA.

Folks in the military community were able to blend the two and

diminish--here in Congress we were worried about this--and diminish and

separate the power of the DCI. We look back now, and the 9/11

Commission certainly did, and say that was part of the problem. They

created the vulnerabilities and weaknesses and openings the terrorists

took advantage of on September 11.

I thank the Senator from North Dakota. He is

absolutely right in his statement.

We heard from witness after witness in our committee's deliberations

in August and into September that probably worse than the status quo--

which is bad, without leadership--would be to create a national

intelligence director and not give him the power to direct. This may be

an old quote my friend is familiar with, but former CIA Director Jim

Woolsey said: In Washington, there is a different definition of the

golden rule. He who has the gold makes the rules.

We are making sure the national intelligence director has the gold,

which is to say the budget authority, both to formulate the budget for

this entire community of national intelligence--the so-called tactical

military intelligence budget--that stays with the Department of

Defense.

But while I cannot say the specific percentage, I will tell you under

our proposal--again this is classified, but well over 50 percent of the

budget authority will now go from the Department of Defense to the

national intelligence director. So that position will have that budget

authority in two ways. The first is to formulate the budget. Again,

this is a very important colloquy because we are going to see some

amendments that are intended to reduce the authority of the national

intelligence director over budget to say he basically has to accept the

budget proposals of the constituent agencies. That is not so in our

bill.

The second very important point: Right now the budget for the

intelligence agencies goes to the Department of Defense. Even for the

CIA it goes to the Department of Defense, then to the CIA. In our

proposal, the money goes to the national intelligence director and then

that position parcels it out to the others.

Sure.

I thank the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. President, I will begin, and if the Senator from Maine wants to

get into this, I would welcome her doing so.

First, I would say, again, Senator Collins and I are members of the

Armed Services Committee of the Senate. If we felt there was the

remotest possibility this proposal of ours would shortchange the

warfighters, we would not make it. And believe me, it does not.

A couple things to say: First, we make a distinction in this bill

between the tactical military budget on one hand and the national

intelligence budget on the other. The tactical military budget--

intelligence officials who are working for individual services; Army,

Navy, combatant commanders working on joint programs within the

military for more than one service--that money all stays with the

Department of Defense. But the national intelligence assets, which are

used, let's say, for satellites--which are clearly used by the military

but also provide information that is critically important for the

Department of Homeland Security or the State Department in advising the

President on critical foreign policy decisions--that is under the

national intelligence director, as it should be.

The fact is, a lot of this is worked out in a consulting, consensus

way. But we want to just raise that national interest here. The

military will always be a priority customer of the intelligence

community, but it is not the only customer. The President of the United

States is the most important recipient of intelligence. The Secretary

of State is very important; now the Secretary of Homeland Security.

I believe we have struck exactly a balance here in making sure the

warfighter is well supported. We had very interesting testimony, which

I can share with my friend, from two generals who are heads of two of

the

constituent national intelligence agencies. They said to us they

believe this proposal establishing a national intelligence director

would be an improvement and be an improvement from the point of view of

their agencies because it ended the ambiguity that exists now which

they think is not good for their agencies and ultimately not good for

the military.

I wonder if the Senator from Maine wants to get into this and answer

some of the very good questions my friend from North Dakota has asked.

Mr. President, this is a very important discussion

about another critical part of this bill. Obviously, the Senator from

Alaska has had an extraordinary record of leadership in this and so

many areas of the Senate. He knows the subject matter. He has lived

with it a long time. I understand what we are proposing represents

change. He is quite sincerely concerned about it from the point of view

of our national security interests.

I most of all want to assure him we spent a lot of time thinking

about this. We did not just go for the 9/11 Commission recommendation.

The 9/11 Commission recommended that we disclose not only the bottom

line of the national intelligence budget but, in fact, the budget of

every single agency.

Their argument, as I am sure the Senator from Alaska knows, was that,

one, the public has a right to know. Of course, we have to balance it--

what we disclose to our enemies--against national security, but if the

budgets of those constituent agencies were out in the public, then

maybe over the years the public and more Members of Congress might have

decided we were not putting enough money into human intelligence, CIA,

et cetera, and that we were putting too much into signal intelligence

and that we would not have had the shortfall many people think we have

now.

In our committee, Senator Collins and I decided we were not ready to

make that leap of disclosing the budgets of the 15 constituent agencies

of the intelligence community because we thought there was some risk

involved about signaling the movement of our resources to those who

wish us ill.

Incidentally, there were some members of the Commission who felt very

strongly about the disclosure of the budgets of all the agencies,

including some former Members of this Chamber who really feel this was

at the heart of it. We did not think so, and that is why we called for

the study.

We think we have, however, achieved something for asking for the

disclosure of the bottom line because at least that tells the taxpayers

and all the Members of Congress how much money we are spending for

intelligence.

In the course of this investigation, I asked some specific questions,

obviously in closed settings, about the amount of money we are spending

overall and for each individual agency. I was surprised at the answers

I got. I think maybe more Members of Congress should ask those

questions.

But this is what I think we do achieve by having the bottom line

disclosed. We are fulfilling a responsibility to the taxpayers to let

them know how much money we are spending on intelligence because it is

just the bottom line, without giving any particular guidance to our

enemies as to where we are putting that money.

The second point is, one result of this might be when more Members of

Congress and the public see what we are spending on intelligence, which

is so critical in the war on terrorism--intelligence is always critical

in warfare and even more critical today because of the nature of this

enemy which strikes at undefended targets, innocent civilians, and is

crazy enough to blow themselves up.

So the more we can see and hear and know what they are planning, the

more likely we are going to be able to stop them.

One conclusion, I say to my friend from Alaska, might be that Members

of Congress and the public might conclude we are not spending enough on

intelligence if they see the bottom line.

Mr. President, I say to my friend from Alaska, it is

impossible that he and I can both be wrong.

We have been there before.

Listen, because of who you are and what you stand for, Senator

Collins

and I will certainly think about this. We think we have struck a good

balance in just asking for disclosure of the bottom line, no details,

beginning public consideration of what we are spending on intelligence,

and this study we ask for in 180 days, 6 months, and then we can make

some judgments beyond that.

I yield the floor. I thank the Senator. This is an important

discussion.

Mr. President, I want to read a few sentences from the

9/11 Commission Report on page 416 which I think are relevant. It says:

Here is a point that one of the members of the Commission, again a

former member of this body, made from the 9/11 Commission Report.

That is in defense of disclosing the 15 individual agency budgets.

I say to the Senator from Alaska, who knows this better than I--and I

am honored to serve on the authorizing Armed Services Committee--we

give a fair amount of detail of the budget in terms of military

programs.

I know that is true.

Sure.

A final response on this point. The Senator from

Alaska says correctly if one looks at the overall budget of a given

military agency, it does not tell what they are spending on different

programs. So I want to assure the Senator from Alaska that under the

committee's proposal, not only do we not talk about what is being spent

on specific programs and specific intelligence agencies, we do not talk

about what is being spent in those agencies. We talk about the one

number, the conglomerate bottom line or top-line number, and I think

that only gives a general idea of what we are investing in

intelligence, far from any specific information about what we are

investing in particular kinds of intelligence, signal, human, image,

let alone specific programs.

I would not do this if I thought it would jeopardize our national

security. In fact, that is why we did not call, as the Commission

requested, for disclosure of individual agency budgets because we

worried it might, and that is why we are asking for a report from the

national intelligence director.

Mr. President, I rise to oppose the Hollings

amendment. The Senator from South Carolina raised a question: Who cares

about the country? Who is putting the country's interests and security

first?

I assure him that Senator Collins and I, the members of our committee

from both parties, care about the country, care about the security of

the country, worry about the imminence of a terrorist attack, read the

reports, came in July and August and September, worked real hard to

produce this proposal.

Talk about treating something casually, the amendment of the Senator

from South Carolina would casually eliminate all our work and that of

the 9/11 Commission and a series of commissions going back to 1947,

when the National Security Act was adopted, recommending a strong

national intelligence director.

What you are doing is creating a position that is cosmetic, that has

no teeth to it, and will not be able to do what we need to do. It will

bring us back to where we were before September 11, with no one in

charge and, even worse, the appearance of someone in charge.

Witness after witness--people no one would treat casually,

Secretaries of State, heads of the intelligence community, the past

three or four of those people said: The worst thing you can do is to

create a position and not give that position the authority to direct

the intelligence community.

With all respect, that is what the amendment of the Senator from

South Carolina is doing.

Secretary Powell said to us on September 13 of this year at a

hearing:

The one created in our bill--

Stansfield Turner, CIA Director under President Carter, told us on

August 16:

That is what we do.

With all respect, not casually, we have built in a lot of time and

effort that this committee put in over a period of time on a totally

bipartisan basis. This amendment would take us back to where we were

when we were struck on September 11, 2001. I don't want to go back

there, and that is why I oppose this amendment.

Mr. President, I thank our colleagues from West

Virginia, Texas, and Kansas for this amendment. It has been a priority

of our focus, Senator Collins and mine and the committee, to make sure

that intelligence is not only coordinated by the national intelligence

director and the dots are connected, but that intelligence be high

quality and objective and subjected to the competition of ideas. This

amendment makes that basic approach even stronger.

I thank our friends for all they have done. Senator Rockefeller,

again, if I haven't said it on the floor, has been a tremendous

contributor to our effort. I thank him for all the support he has

given.

Mr. President, I rise with Senator McCain to offer

this amendment that takes the fight against terrorism right to where

they live--right to their front lines.

This amendment says we will identify terrorist havens and--working

with our allies--we will break them up and keep them on the run.

They will have no peace, no rest, no time to settle in and plot

destruction.

This amendment also says we will attack and cut their most vital

supply line--the disaffected young who serve as recruits.

We will do this by showing the Muslim world--especially the young--

that we believe in and can help them achieve their dreams of living in

a 21st century world that still respects the tenets of Islam.

These goals are a challenge. But if we succeed--and we must--this

generation will see the calls to jihad fade and the global chorus

celebrating our shared humanity and peaceful futures grow.

Let us start with the challenge of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries

and their sense of safety.

As the 9/11 Commission reported, terrorist cells stretch from

Afghanistan right into the major cities of Europe. And as 9/11 proved,

into the United States as well.

To fight and win this war, we need to identify these pockets of

terrorist sanctuaries and, working with other nations, develop

strategies that in the words of the Commission:

The Commission did identify specific countries where we should

concentrate our immediate efforts and I would like to focus on two of

them.

One is Afghanistan. This almost goes without saying.

This is where al-Qaida trained its killers. This is where the 9/11

plot was hatched. This is where the tyrannical Taliban rulers enslaved

an entire nation except for those who plotted global destruction.

This amendment says that Congress needs to authorize the aid and

support necessary for the entire Afghan nation to finally realize its

freedom, which is so close but still so fragile.

At this stage, half measures in Afghanistan are the same as throwing

a five-foot rope to someone drowning 10 feet away. We can't let that

happen.

Another country identified by the Commission was Pakistan.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Pakistani government made the

choice to stand with us in the fight against terrorism at great risk to

the stability of the nation and the lives of its leaders.

We have no choice but to stand by them.

Pakistan may be an imperfect ally at times. But they have been a

loyal ally--committing troops on their own frontiers to hunt down al-

Qaida fighters and denying them safe bases.

This amendment says we not only need to maintain our current

financial support of Pakistan, but let the Pakistanis know we are

making a long-term commitment to the future of their nation.

They need to know they have our support for as long as they remain

true to their goals of defeating domestic extremists, promoting a civil

society and preserving the hope of Pakistani democracy that can become

another beacon for the Muslin world in the years to come.

Just imagine if one of the outcomes of the global war against

terrorism was stable democracies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.

This goal is within our grasp. It is within our means. Only our

vision can fail us now.

And vision--long-term vision--is what we will need to fulfill the

second part of the strategy outlined in this amendment.

We must win over the minds of the Muslim world, especially the young,

by reaching out and talking to them in ways we never have before.

Let me pose a question the 9/11 Commission asked.

How can a man hiding in a cave be communicating more effectively with

the Muslim world than the nation that invented mass media and the

Internet?

The 9/11 Commission report said:

But it doesn't matter if we don't effectively communicate that

vision.

This amendment says we must improve our mass communications efforts

with the Muslim world through sustained and well-funded broadcast

efforts on satellite television and radio.

That is a good start. But this can't just be an air war. Minds are

won over more by actions than words.

And this amendment looks to engage the minds of Muslim youth by

rebuilding scholarship, student exchange and library programs.

It also calls for establishing an International Youth Opportunity

Fund--that other nations would be asked to contribute to--that would

help build and operate primary and secondary schools in Muslim nations

committed to public education.

Why do this? Because most of these nations are too poor to pay for

public education.

Instead, students attend Madrassahs that far too often are classrooms

where hatred is taught and bigotry affirmed.

Consider this: In Karachi, Pakistan, 200,000 students attend

Madrassahs; 200,000 in one city alone. Multiply that over the entire

Muslim world. We can't possibly keep up with those numbers year after

year.

The challenges ahead of us are daunting. But with this amendment we

say that we are ready and willing to go to the front lines of the

terrorist world and take away the sanctuaries where they hide--and take

back the minds that they steal.

This is another in a series of amendments that Senator McCain and I

have offered to carry out the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

This one has to do with recommendations they have made with regard to

foreign policy. It has been cleared on both sides. I urge its adoption.